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PAUL WRAGG* 
In her excellent, thought-provoking article in the Ohio State Law Journal, 
Professor Ringhand makes a valuable and much-needed contribution to what 
she describes as the “urgent conversation” concerning the “combined threat of 
online electioneering and foreign interference in domestic elections.”1 Sadly, 
she is right to say that our democratic way of life is imperiled. As she notes, the 
U.S. experience of “fake news” and its apparent influence on the U.S. 
presidential election was foreshadowed by the U.K. experience, in which the 
narrow decision to leave the European Union (EU) was strongly influenced, it 
seems, by various untruths (downright lies) spread by pro-Leave campaign 
groups.2 
Professor Ringhand’s comprehensive analysis of the laws governing 
campaign financing in the United Kingdom and United States is impressive for 
both its technical flair and systematic theorizing. As she says, we can divide 
these rules into four discrete issues relating to public education, transparency, 
sources of campaign finance, and campaign speech content.3 I tend to agree with 
much of what Professor Ringhand says. The few areas I disagree with are set 
out below. The overarching theme of my response is this: whereas I agree that 
the law can be improved, including in the ways that Professor Ringhand urges, 
I question whether law alone can address the underlying problems to which that 
she alerts us. Indeed, I question whether law is effective at all in these 
circumstances or whether change may simply do more harm than good. For even 
when there is compelling evidence that the rules were breached—as is apparent 
in varying degrees in the U.S. and U.K. elections of 20164—the damage has 
been done. What can law do to reverse the consequences? I do not mean this 
literally—we can, of course, annul the results of an election or referendum—I 
mean pragmatically. People are stubborn—they will react with something like 
open hostility if told their vote was stupid or that they were conned (indeed, we 
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ST. L.J. 405, 405–06 (2020). 
 2 See id. at 407. 
 3 Id. at 418–19. 
 4 See id. at 409–10 (discussing the investigations occurring in the United States and 
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have seen this in post-Brexit-vote Britain).5 How can we be sure that they will 
not vote the same way again? How can we be sure that they will not conclude 
“there’s no smoke without fire”? 
Moreover, even when we have proof of rule-breaching, can we really say 
that voters have been manipulated? Can “duped” voters claim that the moral 
responsibility for their actions was rendered nugatory by the fact of, say, foreign 
intervention or disinformation? Or is caveat emptor all that can be said? 
Part of the reason I admire Professor Ringhand’s analysis is her recognition 
of public education in this process.6 This sets her apart from other commentators 
in this field. Typically, commentators assume a model of voter behavior that is 
too conjectural to provide the sort of solid premises on which to build reliable 
conclusions. For example, commentators—and the law, in fact—assume that 
voters will make the right decisions if they are given the right information.7 At 
other times, in other contexts, commentators see the problem but misdiagnose 
it, for they will lament what they call voter irrationality, usually in reference to 
political expression and the contemporary appetite for brash, simple, “tell-it-
how-it-is” forms of political campaigning, in which populism is king and 
liberalism is either sinister or naïve (or, as Putin called it recently: obsolete).8 
But, to my mind, this is too simplistic: President Trump’s admirers and 
Brexiteers are not irrational in a sort of “Dr. Seuss, Green Eggs and Ham” sort 
of way. It may be a form of bounded rationality but still rationalism, nonetheless.  
My point is this: people vote according to their lived experience, which 
produces in them their own sense of credibility and comprehensibility. Voters 
understand propositions according to what they have seen, heard, and done. 
Thus, their sense of truth depends upon whether the information presented to 
them resonates with their worldview. If it does, then they are bound to act upon 
it. If not—and if the thing that this information represents is more credible than 
the alternative—then we should be clear that society’s task of correcting the 
misperception is daunting. 
Thus, in relation to, say, the Trump election and the Brexit referendum 
decision, the initial question that prompts our inquiry into campaign financing—
what caused rational beings to think that, whatever the problem was, President 
Donald Trump or Nigel Farage was the answer—should take account of this 
issue first. For we shall not make much progress unless and until we have 
tackled campaign financing. 
 
 5 See Sarah Harrison, Hostility Between Voters over Brexit Feels Hopeless, but Our 
Research May Show a Way to Bridge the Divide, INDEPENDENT (June 3, 2019), 
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 6 See id. at 24–27. 
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www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48795764 [https://perma.cc/3FN8-L48J]. 
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I cannot speak to the Trump election, however, as an Englishman, I can say 
something about the Brexit referendum. For it was apparent, both during the 
process and after, that the Leave campaign strategy worked phenomenally well 
because its message was plausible. The most well-known of these—and I think 
to American audiences as well—was the Leave campaign’s slogan, plastered 
garishly across a big red bus, which claimed (erroneously) that the United 
Kingdom sends £350 million per week to the EU and that this could be better 
spent on funding the National Health Service (NHS) instead.9 Perhaps less 
known to an international audience were the campaign’s claims that Turkey was 
about to gain membership to the EU (it was not)10 and that a flood of Syrian 
refugees, escaping their war-torn country were making their way, inexorably, in 
the millions, to the United Kingdom11 (they were not, but I notice that President 
Trump repeated the same line to describe the infamous Mexican caravan 
heading for California, which I am told still hasn’t arrived).12 These tropes—of 
solving the chronic financial problems of the NHS, of immigrants taking 
“advantage” of “soft-touch” Britain (in fact, all available data shows that 
immigrants are net contributors to the United Kingdom and are a vital source of 
economic prosperity,13 including doing the jobs that over-privileged white 
Britain refuses to do), and of the European Union being an anti-democratic, 
corrupt institution—were all demonstrably wrong, as the chief actors in the 
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Legacy of the Migrant Caravan, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www 
.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/border-baja-california/story/2019-11-17/one-year-later-
the-unpredicted-legacy-of-the-migrant-caravan [https://perma.cc/WKA3-UUDU].  
 13 OXFORD ECON., THE FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE UK: A REPORT FOR THE 
MIGRATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE 21 (2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759376/The_Fiscal_Impac
t_of_Immigration_on_the_UK.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7UL-BL8L]. 
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Leave campaign have partially admitted,14 but all served their purpose. The 
Leave campaign was also cannier than Remain in utilizing a central slogan—
“let’s take back control”—which empowered people (or otherwise gave the 
impression of empowerment)—in a way that many clearly responded to, as if it 
gave them palpable influence on their destiny.15 
Yet, the absence of any popular reaction to the (left wing) media’s sustained 
demolition of the Leave campaign’s false claims speaks volumes. Indeed, it has 
become commonplace to hear those that voted Leave say that they voted for 
reasons other than those that have been proved false.16 Interestingly, these 
alternative reasons are rarely revealed let alone explained. As I said earlier, no 
one likes to be told they are stupid (no matter how nicely it is dressed up). 
Nevertheless, the response speaks to the populist attitude that knowledge, 
intelligence, and learning are elitist and that only instinct, belief, and feeling are 
authentic.17 These are the people who think cabinet minister Michael Gove was 
right to say in 2016 that “[Britain has] had enough of experts”—after he would 
not name a single expert to support his belief that Britain would prosper out of 
Europe.18 It may be that the Leave voters were not swayed by the Leave 
campaign’s rhetoric, or else genuinely believe that they were not, and so would 
have voted to leave anyway—or it may be that they are too embarrassed to admit 
to being suckered.19 
Nevertheless, this anecdotal evidence reminds us of an essential feature of 
our democratic way of life: that there can be no guarantees about the quality of 
voter decision-making. Thus, whereas we can make endless refinements to the 
input process—the sort of information that voters have access to—we can do 
nothing about the output—that is to say, the intellectual processes that voters 
bring to bear upon that information. I do not mean this in an intellectually 
 
 14 John Lichfield, Boris Johnson’s £350m Claim Is Devious and Bogus. Here’s Why, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/ 
18/boris-johnson-350-million-claim-bogus-foreign-secretary [https://perma.cc/C3ND 
-VQB8]. 
 15 Polly Toynbee, On Friday I’ll Get My Country Back. Britain Will Vote Remain, 
GUARDIAN (June 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/21/ 
friday-britain-remain-leave-campaign-foreigners [https://perma.cc/RY9B-NAEJ].  
 16 The two main reasons surveys of Britons reveal they voted to leave were 
“immigration” and “sovereignty.” NOAH CARL, CTR. FOR SOC. INVESTIGATION, CSI BREXIT 
4: PEOPLE’S STATED REASONS FOR VOTING LEAVE OR REMAIN 1 (Apr. 2018), 
https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CSI-Brexit-4-People%E2%80%99 
s-Stated-Reasons-for-Voting-Leave.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WM8-824D]; see also Dorian 
Lynskey, ‘I Thought I’d Put in a Protest Vote’: The People Who Regret Voting Leave, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/25/protest-
vote-regret-voting-leave-brexit [https://perma.cc/ZMW5-VFEM].  
 17 See Lynskey, supra note 16.  
 18 Henry Mance, Britain Has Had Enough of Experts, Says Gove, FIN. TIMES (June 3, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c [https:// 
perma.cc/Z6DY-4GBS].  
 19 See Lynskey, supra note 16 (“To admit that you now believe you were wrong 
requires unusual honesty and courage; publicly to admit it takes even more.”).  
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snobbish way, as if I am about to advocate some sort of educational threshold 
for voter eligibility (although there are many historical characters, J.S. Mill 
included, who have toyed with this idea)20—not least because I am not 
convinced that IQ has much to do with these problems. I mean only to signal 
this: that although we might think voters should vote conscientiously and 
dispassionately, they may equally act irresponsibly, ill-advisedly, and ruefully. 
As a democratic society, though, our commitment to total enfranchisement 
outweighs most everything else. Indeed, this commitment is so strong as to 
represent the irreducible minima of democracy: one person, one vote.  
How a person uses this vote though—what considerations they take into 
account, and what considerations they ignore—is irrelevant to their eligibility 
to vote. Whether they make the right decision or make a decision they later 
regret is equally irrelevant. As Martin Redish memorably put it, if a voter picks 
a candidate because of how he wears his tie, who are we to argue?21  
Professor Ringhand disagrees. She argues that better public education can 
help tackle this problem by “mak[ing] voters more critical consumers of 
political messages they see online.”22 Her primary point here concerns school-
age education—she does not mention what is to be done with the post-school 
electorate which, of course, will make up the overwhelming majority for the 
foreseeable future.23 Even if we implemented these programs today, capturing 
all of our sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds, we should have to wait something like 
thirty to forty years before this enlightened group accounted for the majority of 
the electorate.24 I suspect, though, that the omission of adults is deliberate and 
that Professor Ringhand is mindful of Hannah Arendt’s admonishment that 
“[e]ducation can play no part in politics, because in politics we always have to 
deal with those who are already educated.”25 For “[w]hoever wants to educate 
adults really wants to act as their guardian and prevent them from political 
activity.”26 As she said: “Since one cannot educate adults, the word ‘education’ 
has an evil sound in politics; there is a pretense of education, when the real 
purpose is coercion without the use of force.”27 In other words, the collective 
good cannot be pursued at the expense of individual autonomy. This too is an 
immutable, irreducible minima of the open society and the secret to the good 
 
 20 J. Joseph Miller, J.S. Mill on Plural Voting, Competence and Participation, 24 HIST. 
POL. THOUGHT 647, 647 (2003) (“[I]ndeed, Mill's justification of plural voting is largely 
driven by his worry that those competent to run society will be effectively shut out of 
governing by the uneducated masses.”).  
 21 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 619 (1982). 
 22 Ringhand, supra note 1, at 419. 
 23 See id.; Richard Fry, Millennials Approach Baby Booomers as America’s Largest 
Generation in the Electorate, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.pewresearch 
.org/fact-tank/2018/04/03/millennials-approach-baby-boomers-as-largest-generation-
in-u-s-electorate/ [https://perma.cc/ZAM4-73XR].  
 24 See generally Fry, supra note 23.  
 25 HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 176 (1993). 
 26 Id. at 176.  
 27 Id. 
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life. Ignorance nor error can be erased. Voters will make mistakes and live to 
regret them. 
I tend to think Arendt is right about this (as she was about most things). 
Accordingly, I cannot agree entirely with Professor Ringhand’s conclusion that 
public education efforts “raise few serious legal issues.”28 Whilst, as a matter of 
practice this may be true, I think it does raise an important point of principle that 
we should bear in mind. Any attempt by government to correct 
misunderstandings or raise awareness should be treated with the deepest 
suspicion for the difference between beneficence, innocent error, and outright 
propaganda is slight. For example, in both the Trump election and the Brexit 
referendum, the threat of foreign interference was said to emanate from the 
right-wing, rendering left-wing exhortations to voters, warning them of this 
danger, a source of serious tension with the very principle of liberalism it is 
entrusted to defend.29 For the underlying paternalism motivating this 
intervention undermines individual autonomy even though it intended to do no 
such thing.  
To my mind, two separate concerns have become intertwined in the debate 
on campaign financing. Although both naturally arise from the subject of 
fairness in democratic decision-making, only one ought to determine our 
thinking on campaign finance law. As I see it, this legitimate concern relates to 
the impact on candidates themselves should there be no limitations on spending. 
In a democracy, the only qualities in a candidate that matter are their internal 
qualities—their capacity for reason, thought, integrity, compassion (in other 
words, their capacity for statesmanship)—and not their external qualities—their 
wealth, their looks, their privileges. Since there is no direct correlation between 
wealth and intelligence, as Donald Trump proves every single day, then it must 
be removed from the board in the game of politics. This is why limitations on 
campaign financing are so important—so that we achieve something like 
fairness between candidates and so that the candidate with the best internal 
qualities has the greatest prospect of success. This, at any rate, is the theory. 
The other concern in the debate is the capacity of wealth to influence voters 
in terms of what they see and hear. The fear is that the more one candidate can 
dominate the attention of the voter, the more likely they are to win. Yet this 
concern easily merges into a separate matter, which is the quality of the 
information that voters are exposed to and how attempts of one candidate to 
correct misrepresentations, of themselves, of their politics, and of their 
opponents, may be drowned out by the greater resources of that opponent. This 
is an important concern, but its paternalistic undertones render it something 
other than a concern purely about the fairness of the fight between opponents. 
It makes it a debate about the quality of public decision-making. 
As I have said, this sort of reasoning is problematic as a matter of principle, 
to the extent that paternalism threatens individual autonomy. Yet it is also 
 
 28 Ringhand, supra note 1, at 422. 
 29 See id. at 408–10.  
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problematic as a practical matter, as the aftermath of the Brexit contest also 
illustrates. As Professor Ringhand says, the United Kingdom, like the United 
States, has strict rules concerning third-party campaign funding.30 The Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA) imposes onerous 
obligations on third-party campaigners, who must register with the Electoral 
Commission (EC) and disclose detailed reports on their financial 
arrangements.31 The spending limits, however, are complicated and relate to, 
for example, how much can be spent in each of the four regions of the United 
Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland)32 and how much 
can be spent in a specific constituency.33 In the last general election, for 
example, the amount that third-party (or, as the EC calls them, non-party) 
campaigners could spend on campaign activities was limited to a maximum of 
£645,759.34 
Professor Ringhand draws our attention to a pertinent example concerning 
the Brexit leave campaign.35 These campaigners, led by an individual called 
Arron Banks, spent millions in supporting that campaign, and successfully so.36 
As Professor Ringhand comments, Banks’s involvement with Rock Holdings 
Limited—an offshore company based in the Isle of Man—as well as another 
called Better for the Country Limited was referred, by the EC, to the National 
Crime Agency on suspicion of having breached PPERA, including the suspicion 
of foreign influence or foreign sources of funding being involved.37 In a terse 
report, the NCA reported that it had concluded its investigations and had found 
no such breaches of PPERA.38 Moreover, despite persistent rumors of foreign 
involvement, it had found no evidence of such.39  
As I understand it, the NCA was not investigating, nor asked to investigate, 
Banks and his associates in relation to the sums spent and whether the amounts 
 
 30 See id. at 415. 
 31 Id. at 431. 
 32 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, UK PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL ELECTION 2019: NON-
PARTY CAMPAIGNERS 11, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/ 
2019-11/Non-party%20campaigner%20UKPGE%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBC8-
LZCQ] [hereinafter THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, UK GENERAL ELECTION]. 
 33 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNS 9, https://www 
.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/Overview-of-non-party-campaigns-
gen.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK6Q-THQT].  
 34 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, UK GENERAL ELECTION, supra note 32, at 13.  
 35 Ringhand, supra note 1, at 445–47. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Public Statement on NCA Investigation into Suspected EU Referendum Offences, 
NAT’L CRIME AGENCY (Sept. 24, 2019), https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/public 
-statement-on-nca-investigation-into-suspected-eu-referendum-offences [https://perma 
.cc/J2CP-XCMT].  
 39 Id.; see Ed Caesar, The Chaotic Triumph of Arron Banks, the “Bad Boy of Brexit”, 
NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/25/the-
chaotic-triumph-of-arron-banks-the-bad-boy-of-brexit [https://perma.cc/ZT7Q-A8B7] 
(discussing laws that criminalize the use of foreign money in campaigns).  
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breached the law. Nevertheless, there is something amiss, to my mind, if a 
person, acting alone or as part of a group, can spend at least £2.9 million on 
campaign financing (and possibly as much as £8 million)40 and not be in breach 
of spending limits—for what does it mean to say there are “limits” if they do 
not apply in circumstances like this? It is all very well to say that no single 
company breached those limits, but that is hardly an answer.  
Nevertheless, I question how much even absolute transparency would have 
done to alter the result—in Brexit and the U.S. presidential election—and thus 
how much it would influence future decisions. For example, in the case of 
Brexit, regardless of whether the public was sufficiently informed about the 
nature and consequences of Brexit prior to the referendum, it has since then 
learnt the hard way that the process is far more complicated than anyone could 
have anticipated (apparently).41 Moreover, the demonstrable falsehood of the 
Leave campaign’s promises and assertions has been laid bare by the media 
(newspapers, broadcasters, and internet-based commentators) and is readily 
accessible to the discerning public. Nevertheless, and—incredibly—despite the 
shambolic, embarrassing way in which the Conservatives have conducted 
themselves during these proceedings, they still managed to gain a significant 
majority of the votes in the 2019 general election42 and now find themselves in 
a position of almost unassailable power.  
So much for our theories about enlightened democracy.  
 
 40 Peter Walker & Jim Waterson, Arron Banks Faces Criminal Inquiry over Brexit 
Campaign, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/nov/ 
01/arron-banks-referred-to-agency-over-suspected-offences-in-brexit-campaign [https 
://perma.cc/NQG7-3MN9].  
 41 See generally Lynskey, supra note 16 (discussing those that voted in favor of Brexit 
and have since regretted their vote).  
 42 UK Results: Conservatives Win Majority, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/ 
election/2019/results [https://perma.cc/25KH-TRFH]. 
